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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
r ~ rrn~D

P.\IU\: CITY
p .\ ~ Y, a <'Ol'liOration,

~fiNES COl\l-

Plaintiff,
CasP No.
10061

- YS.-

1,HE I~DlT~TRIAL CO:JIMIS.SION
OF tTAH & JOHN \Y. PRESCOTT,

Defendants.

BRIEF O·F PLAINTIFF
NATURE OF CASE

This i~ an appeal fron1 an order of the Industrial
('ommission of rtah granting defendant Prescott (herein called .. Prescott") cmnpensation for pennanent total
disability on the basis of injuries which, plaintiff contends, art> properly compensable as being only partially
disabling under ~Pction 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated
1953.
DI~PO~ITIOX

BY IXDrSTRIAL CO~I:JIISSIOX

The Industrial Commission ordered payment of
compensation for permanent total disability in accord1
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ance with the provisions of Section 35-1-67, Utah Code
Annotated 1953.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks vacation of the aforesaid order of
the Industrial Commission on the grounds (1) that the
Commission acted arbitrarily and in excess of its powers
in finding and concluding that the injuries sustained by
defendant Prescott in his enlploYJ.nent resulted in permanent total disability, and (2) that the findings do not
support the award under review.

STATEMENT OF FACT'S
Prescott was involved in a tragic mine accident on
July 13, 1961. His injuries included fractures of right
ribs and shoulder blade and right lung puncture. He
complains of some residuals from these injuries, (soreness of his right arm and a sensation of numbness in
his right side (R-62) ), but there is no medical evidence
of significant functional impairment or failure of these
injured members to heal (R-5, 15, 23, 83, 88, 89; and
refer to comments in Argument).
The injury of real consequence (so far as disability
evaluation is concerned) was a traumatic amputation
of Prescott's left leg with associated avulsion of soft
tissue in the inguinal area. Further surgical amputation
and debridement have left little soft tissue with which a
prosthetic device can make contact (R-20), and Prescott has very limited ambulation with an artificial leg.
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Prescott was referred to a Medical Advisory Board
appointed hy the Commission for evaluation of the disability from hi~ work-rPlatt•d injuries. The Board found
Prescott to hun• sustained a 90o/o loss of '"bodily function'' as that tenn is employed in the next to concluding
paragraph of Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. 1953, the section
relating to pern1anent partial disability (R-15).
Pn·~eott does not contest or disagree with the 90%

rating of the :Medical Advisory Board. He rnerely contends that a 90)c ''loss of bodily function" is tantmnount
to total disability (R-52, 5-l).
Finally, Prescott is more than sixty-six years of age
(H-~>~) and of lower average mentality (R-23, 83). Becau8e of his age, 1nentality and limited ambulation, he
cannot compete for employment (R-82). He has made
n good psychological and emotional adjustment to his
injury (R-23, 8-t).
ARGU~1:ENT

POINT I
THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF FUNCTION IN
THIS CASE IS THE LOSS ATTENDANT UPON LEG
AMPUTATION, AND THE RULE THAT PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY MAY BE PRE1SUMED
FROM INABILITY TO RESUME PRE-INJURY TYPE
OF WORK DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE LOSS
SUSTAINED IS ONE OF THOSE IN THE STATUTORY SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC AWARDS.

\Y e would not atte1npt to minimize the functional
loss Prescott sustained by reason of the amputation of
his leg. The trauma and subsequent surgical procedures
have clearly left Prescott in essentially the position of
an amputee whose shunp is not sufficient to permit
the use of an artificial leg. This was his testimony, and
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the rating g1ven hiln by the ?\ledieal AclYi~or)· Board
entitles hi1n to exactly what the statute provides for
amputation at the hip.
The error we see in the Con11nission's position is
that it has found permanent total disability on this loss
of function coupled only with the fact that Prescott is
too old, in view of his lower average Inentality, to be
employable. vV e sub1nit that such a finding constitutes
an administrative construction of the statute which is
in direct conflict with the construction given it by this
Court.
vVe must agree that this Court, by its decisions
beginning with Caillet v. Industrial Commission (90
Utah 8, June 18, 1936) and concluding with Thomas v.
Commission (95 Utah 32, ~;fay 11, 1938), evolved a rule
of law that permanent total disability is established, in
a proper case, by a showing that the injured workman
cannot perform work of the kind he was performing
when injured or any other work which a man of his
mentality or attainments might do. The first problem
is to determine what is a proper case.
The decision which best states the philosophy of
the Court as it applies to the instant case is Babick v.
Industrial Commission (91 Utah 581, 65 P.2d 1133).
Justice Wolfe there reconsidered the language of the
Caillet decision (which announced the general principle
of law to which we have referred) and refined the
judicial statement by this commentary:
"In the Caillet Case, the applicant had one
hand off and two fingers of the other hand ampu-
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tatt·d. ahnost to tlll' \\Tist, whj('h gave hiin 100 per
<'Pnt loss of function of one hand and 60 per cent
ot' tiH· other. He had a 20 per cent loss of knee
ad ion. Th< · <·Yiden<·e showed that his ability to
do any work substantiall~· renumerative was so
negligible as to approach the vanishing point .
.Jloreover, the opportunity to secure the very few
types of work he could do was nil. Perhaps the
language from that case above quoted is a little
too inclusive. It would fit the person who had
one h·g or an arm off. A workman who had
done manual labor who lost an arm or leg could
not 'perform the work of the general character
that he was performing when injured,' and yet
under a strict following of this rule he would
P~tablish a prima facie case. In the first place,
tlw rule "·as not meant to operate in any case
where specific compensation for a loss of a memlwr or loss of function of a mernber was provided
hy statute for pennanent partial disability."
Tlw Commission's determination that this is a
proper case for the application of the Caillet doctrine
is the first error we would cite. Prescott's injury-related
disability is essentially that which attends the loss of
a leg. Xo one who has evaluated this disability has
attached any iinportance to the residuals from the fractures and lung lesion. \V e believe the following is a
fully revealing sunuuary of the n1edical evidence with
reference to the final disabling result of the injuries
to the uppPr torso:
1. As early as July 26, 1961, (less than two
weeks after the injury) Dr. Boyd Holbrook,
an orthopaedic specialist, examined Prescott
and reported his findings in a letter dated
August 2, 1962 (R-p. 5). The gist of the re-
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port is that there should be no significant
disability from the fractures, thPre being no
neurological or circulatory impail'lnent to the
injury sites. vVe believe one paragraph of the
report can be quoted as fairly sununarizing
the medical opinion :
"This type of InJury ordinarily heals
with little if any disability. In view of the
1nany injuries he has sustained, I would advise continued conservative treatment in this
area, and would not recommend operative
repair. If his symptoms persist in this area
after sufficient time for healing, the inner
one inch of the clavicle can be excised."
There is nowhere in this record any indication
that Prescott thereafter consulted Dr. Holbrook or any other physician with reference
to "continued symptoms in this area" or that
such symptoms could not be relieved in the
manner Dr. Holbrook suggests if they persisted.
2. The ~1:edical Advisory Board evaluated Prescott's permanent disability on August 25,
19·62. The Board found (R-15) that the multiple injuries resulted in a ''90% loss of bodily
function." Significantly, the compensation
payable for this percentage loss of function
is exactly the same as that payable for amputation of a leg where prosthesis is not feasible.
It is obvious that the Board (while making
its rating inclusive of all injuries as it must)
considered the upper torso problem to be de
minimis and the only consequential disability
to be that related to the amputation, a kind of
loss for which the statutory schedule specifically provides.
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:;. Dr. Hoy A. Darke, aftPr an examination of
PrP~<'ott on January 22, 1963, reported (R-23)
that Prescott "could likely do well with any
manual training that did not require fine preeise movements." He suggests no impairment
of 1nanual dexterity from injury.
-l. Prescott was evaluated by the Division of

Yocational Rehibilitation of the State Department of Public Instruction, and a report was
made by Mr. Paul ·T. Furlong (R-29, 30) who
also testified (R-72 through 83). l\Ir. Furlong's opinion of unemployability is based
unequivocally on these factors :
a. Age.
b.

Lo~~

of effective an1bulation.

c. Past job history and education.

d. :Mentality.
Thi~

was his concluding testhnony as Prescott's witness (R-83), and not a word was
elicited frmn him on redirect as to his attachment of any importance to the injuries of
the upper torso.

;), Pursuant to a Commission order made during
the course of the hearing in this 1natter, Prescott was examined by Dr. L. E. Viko, an inh-'rni~t, for evaluation of heart and lung pathology. In a two page report (R-88, 89), DT.
Yiko said he ••found, then, no specific lung
pathology." "He (Prescott) does have myocardial changes presumably on an arteriosclerotic basis." Arteriosclerosis is not, of
course, an incident of trauma. Dr. Viko further found the "lungs and abdomen were negative" for pathology except for diminished
heart sounds, and the "lungs were surprisingly
7
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negative for a 1nan who had been 33 years at
1nining work."
On the whole record, therefore, it n1ust lw conceded
that the fractures and lung lesion, howPver strongly thP~'
may have contributed to the general discomfort and
the 1nanagement problem, are not significant in the
final evaluation of disability. Vve are evaluating a man
who, because of injury, has lost a leg and cannot use
an artificial one. This is a kind of loss for which the
statutory schedule specifically provides. Except for
that, the factors which 1nake him unemployable (his
advanced age, his inability to learn, his limited work
experience) are entirely unrelated to his injury.
We subn1it that this is not a proper case for application of the Caillet doctrine. That doctrine has only
been applied where there have been two or more anatomical members or vital systems substantially impaired.
The decisions in point and the me1nbers or systems
involved are these :

Caillet v. Commission (supra) - Amputation of one hand - 60o/o loss of function of the
other hand - 20% loss of knee action.
Standard Coal Co. v. Commission (91 l~tah
549; 65 P.2d 640) - Loss of use equivalent to
amputation of one leg - disabling circulatory
disturbance of other leg (frmn which bone was
taken) presumably injury related-injury-related
obesity.
Carbon Fuel Co. v. Commission (92 Utah
410; 68 P.2d 894) - Drop foot - lordosis, right
hip irreparably out of socket - left femur frac-
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tnn•d at llP<·k- both hip:-; unstable- inch separntion of ~ymph~·~is puhi:-;.
Thoma . . ·. v. Commission (:-;npra) - Loss of
usP of one leg - phlebitis causing j()j~ loss of
other leg and requiring extensive bed care frOin
tinH' to time.
To appl~· tlw Cailld doctrinP in a case where the

only si~ni fieant disahi lit:· results frOin a loss of function <·overed hy a ~p<'eifie statutory provision is a manifpst departure frOin the rule of the Babick case. It
\rould <'l'Pah• a dimatP in which the first objective of
any permanently injured workman would be to demon~trak his inability to learn or be rehabilitated.
POINT II
9or,-~' LOSS OF FUNCTION UNDER SECTION 35-1-66,
U.C.A. 1953, IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO ·TOTAL
DISABILITY.

\r e would emphasize, at the outset, that Prescott
has eom•eded the accurac~· of the J.\;Iedical Advisory Board
di~ahility rating (R-15) which was "90% loss of bodily
function." Counsel so stated at page 52 and again at
page 3-! of the Reeord. Prescott's only contention is
that 90j~ loss of function is so close to total loss that
it should be considered the equivalent. If the term
"bodily function," as it is used in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A.,
meant .. total of bodily functions," we would concede
that Prt:>scott's position in this case is unassailable. A
person who has only 10% of his life processes in function
is helpless and totally disabled by any standard. The
term cannot rationally be assigned such a Ineaning, howt>ver, and this Court has expressed itself on the point.
9
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In the first place, the phrase "loss of bodily function" appears only in the section on pernranent partial
disabiltiy (35-1-66), and that section contemplates that,
in the event there is a total loss of a bodily function not
specifically provided for, the limit of compensation
should be 200 weeks. The paragraph in which the
term appears is this :
''For any other disfigurement or the loss of
bodily function not otherwise provided for herein,
such period of compensation as the commission
shall deem equitable and in proportion as near
as rnay be to c01npensation for specific loss as
set forth in the schedule in this section but not
exceeding in any case two hundred weeks."
\vnen the .Jiedical Advisory Board makes a rating in
tern1s of "loss of bodily function," then, it is orienting to
the only section of the \Vorlrmen's Compensation Act
which employs that tern1 and equating the loss it finds
with the specific losses set forth in the schedulr preceding the quoted paragraph. \Yhat the ::~Iedical Advisory Board found in fact was that the loss of function
Prescott sustained fron1 his injuries was 90% as disabling as the loss of an ann at the shoulder. It did
not find that Prescott's disability was 90% of permanent total disability. Prescott admits that this rating
ts accurate.
\Y e have prY'.Tionsly herein sajd that this Court has
already construed 35-1-GG as \H' contend it must be
construed. In Babick v. Commission (supra), a clear
distinction was drawn between two "zones" of disability.
Disabilities to be appraised in terrns of permanent total
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disability under SPetion 35-1-67 are in one zone; those
to h.. appraised in tern1s of pPnnanent partial disability
undl'r section 35-1-66 are in another. We would refer
t hi' Court to the discussion at 91 Utah 585. In this case,
the Conunission (R-16), Prescott (R-5-1, 56) and the
plaintiff all ackno\vledge that Prescott's disability falls
within the latter zone. Everybody recognizes that Prescolt is not totally disabled from his injttries.

lf wP labor this point, we do so to illuminate the
central issue in this case: It is proper to award permanPnt total disability cmnpensation to a workman, whose
permanent disability is admittedly rated properly at
90% of the loss of an arm, because he had reached, at
the time of his injury, an age where one of his mentality
cannot compete successfully in the labor market 1
POINT III
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED, AS
THE TEST OF TOTAL DISABILITY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE CAILLET CASE, AND THAT DOCTRINE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED.

There is little question about the basis upon which
the Comn1ission decided this case. Commissioner Wiesl~y. during the course of the hearing, accurately stated
tlw doctrine of Caillet v. Commission (supra) and further expressed his belief that it constituted the law of
the case. At the bottom of page 77 of the Record, we
find this:
"THE REFEREE: The last decision of the
Supreme Court that I can recall, written by
Justice Moffat, says that the test of total permanent disability is can the man do the same kind
11
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of work he did before, or by reasonable pffort
prepare hin1self for similar work. But whether
that will stand up, l\Ir. Allen, or not, I don't
know. But that's the last word that I kno\\·. :--;o
I think he may answer."
In the order itself (R-104, 105), only one Utah case i:-;
cited, and that case is Caillet v. Cmnrnission.
As we have previously pointed out, th<' Caillet clo<'trine has been substantially n1odified. Even in a proper
case (which we have already argued this is not) the
test is not whether the en1ployee can return to the sam<'
or si1nilar eu1ployn1ent, but whether he can function
in an econmnic activity "\Vhich one of his 1nentality and
attainn1ents can perforn1. \Ve quote the following from
Justice Wolfe's dissenting opinion in the Thomas case
(supra):
"The language of Caillet v. Industriol Comm.,
90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760, quoted by the prevailing
opinion, was so broad as to take in cases of th1·
loss of a hand. In such case an employee might
show that he was unable without a hand to do
work of the general character he had been doing,
and this made out a prilna facie case. And if the
other side could not show that he could secure
and perform work of a special nature, he would
be as a matter of law, under that rule, permanently and totally disabled. The rule was too narrow and too wide. It was too narrow in that
it n1ade the prin1a facie test in law of permanent
and total disability purely the question of whether
he could perform work of the general character
that he had been performing when injured. It
did not add the phrase ' 'or anY
. other work which
a 1nan of his mentality or attainments might do.'
It was too wide in that it brought in the eco-

12
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nomic situation as a factor in ovcrcmning the
prima facie case. It n1ight be ilnpossible in a
dP}H'I'~~ion to obtain work of a special nature or
any kind of work for a fully able n1an, whilst
in war timP:::;, when every available man is utilizable, any nu1nber of (•ripples could obtain jobs.
Thi~ would 1nean that the prima facie case would
hP met ~uect'ssfully only accordingly to the varying economic situations. The statute nev(-'l' contemplated such a thing."
In the instant ea~<>, there is cmnpetent evidence
hy a uwdical expert, Dr. Darke (R-23), that Prescott
"would likPly do wt'll with 1nanual training that did not
n•quirP t'i1H•, precise 1novements or attention to fine
('Omplirated details." The inescapable conclusion to be
drawn frmn the Record is that the Commission never
considered this evidence as having relevance because of
it~ conYiction that the "test" is ability to return to the
·''(fll/(' or ,. .,.; milar en1ployn1ent.

The Record clearly establishes that Prescott is
limitPd, phy~ieally, to sedentary occupation. This would
be true by reason of his arteriosclerosis (R-88, 89) even
if he had not lost a leg, and the sclerosis is not workrt>lated. \Yithin that lilnitation, he is capable of carrying
on any activity which an uneducated man of lower averagt' mentality can do. All that :Jir. Furlong added to
our understanding of Prescott's situation is that there
aren't any jobs for 66 year old, uneducated, untrained
men who have little n1obility and lower average mentality. It is also true that there aren't any jobs for
~ueh men who do have n1obility (R-80, 81). If en1ployers
haye a choice, they will hire a man who is young,
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trained, intelligent and nwbile over one who has none
of these virtues. Therefore, say~ l\fr. Furlong, Prescott
could not find a job for which there was "competition"
(R-81). ~Ir. Furlong nowhere says, however, that Prescott could not perform, if he were given such a job. By
:Mr. Furlong's standards, a man becon1es permmwntly
and totally disabled when he reaches sixty-five unless
he can demonstrate a skill, a talent or a mental facility
which will overcmne prospective mnployers' natural
preference for younger men.
"\Ve submit that n1ost of the factors to which ~Ir.
Furlong gives weight (Prescott's age, mentality, laek
of education or training and his wife's arthritis (R-29,
30)) have no relation to his injury. To predicate employer liability to pay benefits for total disability upon
those factors violates a basic principle of compensation
la\Y which is, as stated by the editors of Corpus Juris
Secundum (99 C.J.S. 1067), that "in order to warrant
compensation for total disabilit:·, the inability to worli
n1ust be due to the injury."

POINT IV
THIS IS NOT A CASE WHERE A FINDING OF
COMMISSION IS UNDER ATTACK. THE IS<SUE ON
WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT IS PURELY AN
ISSUE OF LAW.

\V P are a warP of the Court's strong reluctance to
disturb a finding of fact 1nade by the Industrial ComInission, and the Court's justified belief that it can
rely on the Con11nission's expertise in evaluating the
evideneP and the credibility of witnesses. \Ve yield to
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norw in our n·spPd for thP { 'mu111i~sion's cmnpetence

nnd till' soundness of its jndgnwnt in this regard. The
t'aet~ are not in dispute in this case, however. The
( 'olnmi~~ion found and everyone agrees that the disahility from injury is <•ssPntially the smne as the loss
of a leg at the hip. Everyone agrees and the Cmnmission presmnably found that Prescott, because of
factors of agP, 1nentality, training and education, is
not likely to win in cmnpetition for jobs. \Vhether or
uot this kind of unemployabilit~, amounts to per1nanent
total disability within the meaning of the Compensation Aets is a pure question of law. We concur in the
findings of fact; W<' believe the Commission's conclusion
of law cannot properly be drawn frmn those facts.
Respectfully subn1itted,
CLYDE, ~fECHAM & PRATT
By FRANK: J. ALLEN
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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